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I. Introduction 
The central topic of scholarship on criminal procedure in the 
United States is the Warren Court’s “criminal procedure 
revolution” of the early 1960s.1 The literature now includes at 
least seven important narratives about the Warren Court 
criminal cases. First, a conservative narrative denounces the 
Warren Court for imposing judge-made law without due regard 
for the cost to social control of the new rules.2 Second, a liberal 
narrative abetted and then celebrated the Warren Court.3 As the 
Court became more sympathetic to law enforcement during the 
1970s and since, liberals criticized the post-Warren justices for 
failing to give the Warren Court landmarks a principled defense.4  
In the liberal narrative, perverse legislative incentives call on 
grounds of process theory for an active judicial role on behalf of 
suspects, defendants, and prisoners drawn disproportionately 
from disempowered groups, especially African-Americans.5 The 
                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Miranda v.  Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966) (holding that 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination mandates that police 
notify individuals in police custody of their right to remain silent and the right 
to counsel); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (declaring that 
indigent criminal defendants in state criminal prosecutions have a right to 
court-appointed counsel). These and other criminal procedure decisions of the 
Warren Court are regarded as landmarks in criminal law. See, e.g., Bernard E. 
Harcourt, Imagery and Adjudication in the Criminal Law: The Relationship 
Between Images of Criminal Defendants and Ideologies of Criminal Law in 
Southern Antebellum and Modern Appellate Decisions, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1165, 
1166 (1995) (describing Gideon and Miranda as “landmark decisions of the 
Warren Court”); Bruce R. Jacob, Memories of and Reflections About Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 33 STETSON L. REV. 181, 185 (2003) (calling Gideon a “landmark 
right-to-counsel case”). 
 2. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 929, 955 (1965) (“Justices are too sophisticated really 
to believe that the first eight amendments speak so clearly on every issue as to 
make irrelevant the hard facts of life.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some 
Comments on the “New” Fifth Amendment and the “Old” Voluntariness Test, 65 
MICH. L. REV. 59, 62 (1966) (arguing that the protections defendants received 
before Miranda were “largely ‘illusory’”). 
 4. See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely, Harris v. New York: 
Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon 
Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1199 (1971) (accusing the Burger Court “of what is, 
at best, gross negligence concerning the state of the record and the controlling 
precedents”). 
 5. See Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the 
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liberal narrative points to the long legislative record of 
indifference or even hostility to the rights of suspects and 
defendants, the persistent and extreme neglect of indigent 
defense being a prominent example.6 Drawing bleaker 
conclusions from similar premises, a third, more radical narrative 
read the Warren Court canon not as revolution, but as 
legitimation and entrenchment.7  
The clash of traditional liberal and conservative narratives 
has never entirely abated.8 That clash, however, lost much of its 
currency after the “punitive turn” in American criminal justice 
                                                                                                     
Theory of Public Choice; or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn about the 
Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1081 (1993) (arguing that 
“active judicial development of constitutional rules governing police, 
prosecutors, and the criminal trial process is a legitimate exercise of judicial 
review”); Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process 
Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 831 (1991) (“[The] Supreme Court must be 
prepared . . . to bar governmentally-imposed burdens on disfranchised groups 
even when popular opinion strongly endorses them, not just when 
transformation of racial attitudes has rendered those burdens increasingly 
anachronistic.”). 
 6. See Note, Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform 
of Indigent Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062, 2067–68 (2000) [hereinafter 
Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled] (“Criminal defendants comprise a political 
constituency with little, if any, leverage; indeed, many felony convicts are 
formally disenfranchised. Public choice theory clearly predicts, and experience 
demonstrates, that indigent defense will be undersupported.” (footnotes 
omitted)).  
 7. See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 
746 (1992) (noting that because “there is no organized political campaign 
comparable to the civil-rights movement dedicated to defending the rights of 
criminal suspects, there is no group that can take even limited advantage of the 
Miranda ‘victory’”). Seidman argued that in Miranda “the Court ended up 
contributing to the smugness and self-satisfaction that are the main enemies of 
growth and reform.” Id. at 747. For application to Gideon, see Kenneth B. Nunn, 
The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the Adversarial Criminal 
Process—A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a Proposal for 
Reform, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 743, 812–13 (1995) (“All that is needed to account 
for judicial economy and legitimacy is a public defender who appears competent, 
no matter how rough an appearance it may be.”). 
 8. Compare, e.g., WILLIAM PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH (1999) 139, 152–
53 (1999) (arguing that our criminal justice system is flawed because it is overly 
adversarial, is too much of a gamble, and is not concerned with seeking the 
truth), with Richard S. Frase, The Whole Truth About American and European 
Criminal Justice, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 785, 846–47  (2000) (reviewing Pizzi and 
arguing that the American criminal justice system is “much more devoted to 
truth-seeking than Pizzi claims, . . . [is] less committed to procedural rights . . . . 
[and] is also less strongly adversary than Pizzi suggests”).  
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policy. During the second half of the 1980s and ever since, 
sentencing policy throughout most of the country became both 
more severe and, with respect to the judiciary, less discretionary.9 
Public prosecutors with plenary discretion to select the charges 
that trigger fixed-sentencing consequences became the most 
important actors in the system.10 Guilty pleas, which accounted 
for about four out of five convictions through the 1970s, accounted 
for more than nine of ten by the end of the twentieth century.11  
The punitive turn coincided with another dramatic 
development in criminal justice—DNA exonerations. The 
prevailing wisdom, often assumed in liberal as well as 
conservative narratives, held that (virtually) all criminal 
defendants are in fact guilty.12 The DNA technique shook that 
confidence. In 1996, a review of tens of thousands of DNA tests 
requested by law enforcement found that about a quarter of the 
conclusive tests exonerated the suspect.13  
The punitive turn and the innocence movement supported 
different, if not entirely new, narratives about the Warren Court’s 
revolution. The innocence movement informed and reinforced a 
fourth narrative concerned with factual accuracy. The accuracy 
narrative faulted the Warren Court for neglecting due process in 
favor of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights that often 
have no (or a perverse) relationship to guilt and innocence.14 
                                                                                                     
 9. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND 
SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 182 (2004) (pointing out that 
“legislators have purposely transferred discretion from judges to prosecutors to 
reduce chances that judges will mitigate sentences”). 
 10. See, e.g., infra note 94 and accompanying text (explaining how the 
severity of criminal statutes, along with an overworked public defender system, 
allows prosecutors to pressure defendants into pleading guilty). 
 11. See Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in 
Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 90–91 (2005) (presenting data 
that shows that the federal guilty plea rate was over 95% in 2002).  
 12. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, The Wisdom and Morality of Present-Day 
Criminal Sentencing, 38 AKRON L. REV. 853, 865 (2005) (“It is true that most 
criminal defendants are guilty. But even [Alan Dershowitz] must be shocked, as 
we all are, now that we have DNA, to realize how many times we have erred.”). 
 13. See Peter Neufeld & Barry Scheck, Commentary, in CONVICTED BY 
JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO 
ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL, at XXVIII–XXXI (1996) (sexual assault cases). 
 14. See DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE 152–55 (2003) 
[hereinafter DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE] (rejecting the incorporation of 
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments and arguing that the “Court’s 
WHY GIDEON FAILED 887 
According to the accuracy narrative, Gideon’s focus on the Sixth 
Amendment’s specific textual reference to “counsel” deflects 
attention from the overall reliability of the proceedings, the 
central focus of due process analysis.15 
The punitive turn provided the ground for two further 
narratives, a race-and-crime narrative based on the African-
American experience and an agency-costs narrative based on the 
perspective of political economy. The fifth narrative emphasizes 
the role of race in criminal justice, that the racially 
disproportionate impact of discretionary drug enforcement, 
mediated by coercive plea “offers” that effectively compel not just 
guilty pleas, but false informant testimony, deprives the criminal 
sanction of the legitimacy that is crucial to effective social 
control.16 So too, in the sixth, the agency-costs narrative, 
prosecutorial power has made the Warren Court landmarks 
irrelevant.17 In response to coercive plea choices, typical 
                                                                                                     
continued reliance on the basic incorporation framework needs to change before 
the law can be made either more legitimate or more functional”); GEORGE C. 
THOMAS III, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: HOW THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 
SACRIFICES INNOCENT DEFENDANTS 12 (2008) (contending that the American 
criminal justice system “often fails” innocent defendants). 
 15. See DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE, supra note 14, at 117–18 
 (“[B]y relying on the Sixth Amendment . . . the Warren Court deflected 
attention from instrumental reliability in favor of a formalistic focus on the 
textually referenced ‘assistance of counsel.’ . . . [B]ecause each defendant has 
‘counsel’—no matter how overworked, inexperienced, lazy, or incompetent—the 
constitutional minima appear to be satisfied.”). 
 16. See PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 233 
(2009) (discussing that while African Americans “account for about 14 percent of 
illegal drug users . . . they represent almost 56 percent of people who are 
incarcerated for drug offenses”). For a rather more provocative comparison of 
today’s criminal justice system with the post-bellum subordination of freed 
slaves and their descendants in the Jim Crow South, see MICHELLE ALEXANDER, 
THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 2 
(2010) (“As a criminal, you have scarcely more rights, and arguably less respect, 
than a black man living in Alabama at the height of Jim Crow. We have not 
ended racial caste in America; we have merely redesigned it.”). 
 17. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal 
Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1997) [hereinafter Stuntz, 
Uneasy Relationship] 
As courts have raised the cost of criminal investigation and 
prosecution, legislatures have sought out devices to reduce those 
costs. Severe limits on defense funding are the most obvious example, 
but not the only one. Expanded criminal liability makes it easier for 
the government to induce guilty pleas, as do high mandatory 
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defendants waive the rights recognized by the Warren Court 
landmarks.18 Those landmarks, on the agency-costs account, may 
even have encouraged the turn to draconian sentences and 
prosecutorial dominance.19  
Finally, a seventh body of discordant scholarship offers 
competing originalist narratives about constitutional criminal 
procedure. The role of originalist methodology in some prominent 
criminal procedure decisions,20 together with early work by Akhil 
Amar,21 impelled both challenges to the theoretical premises of 
originalism22 and a welter of contributions assessing historical 
evidence about the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.23  
Now, as with any body of thoughtful work about the same 
phenomena, the various scholarly narratives agree on many 
points. In particular, scholars writing from all perspectives agree 
that even fifty years after Gideon, the representation of indigent 
                                                                                                     
sentences that serve as useful threats against recalcitrant 
defendants. And guilty pleas avoid most of the potentially costly 
requirements that criminal procedure imposes.  
 18. See Robert K. Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23  HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 127, 131 (1995) (explaining that the Supreme Court “has held that, 
by entering a plea of guilty, a defendant forfeits a broad range of potential legal 
and constitutional appellate claims that would otherwise have been available 
had the case gone to trial”). 
 19. See Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 17, at 4 (“These strategies 
would no doubt be politically attractive anyway, but the law of criminal 
procedure makes them more so.”).  
 20. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49, 68–69 (2004) 
(reversing the defendant’s conviction after examining the Sixth Amendment’s 
Confrontation Clause “upon the original understanding of the common-law 
right” to confrontation). 
 21. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST 
PRINCIPLES 153 (1997) (“Textual argument is . . . a proper starting point for 
proper constitutional analysis.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Akhil Amar and the (Premature?) 
Demise of Criminal Procedure Liberalism, 107 YALE L.J. 2281, 2292–93 (1998) 
(book review) (“Unfortunately, however, Amar never explains exactly why we 
should treat historical practice as important. The Framers’ world notoriously 
was not our own, and the differences are nowhere more apparent than when 
talking about issues of criminal procedure.” (footnote omitted)).  
 23. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth 
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 556 (1999) (presenting a detailed historical 
examination of the Fourth Amendment and concluding, in part, that “we now 
accord [police] officers far more discretionary authority than the Framers ever 
intended or expected”). 
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felony defendants in the state courts is generally inadequate. In 
other words, there is a scholarly consensus that Gideon has 
failed.  
The traditional liberal narrative traces the parlous state of 
indigent defense to the same conservative political trend that 
supported the punitive turn. Richard Nixon’s four appointees to 
the Court changed judicial ideology on criminal justice.24 On the 
liberal account, the villain is not Gideon but the Burger Court’s 
subsequent decision in Strickland v. Washington.25 An extensive 
literature condemns Strickland for tolerating systemic conditions 
that structurally preclude effective representation.26 Traditional 
conservatives agree that indigent defense is in bad shape;27 their 
clash with the liberals is what to do about it.  
The liberal commentators offer various reform proposals, all 
of which thus far have fallen on deaf judicial ears.28 The 
traditional conservative position opposes reform imposed from 
the top down by the Court in favor of leaving difficult decisions 
                                                                                                     
 24. See Ronald F. Wright, How the Supreme Court Delivers Fire and Ice to 
State Criminal Justice, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1439–40 (2002) (explaining 
that Chief Justice Burger and President Nixon’s three other Supreme Court 
appointees “changed the rules of habeas corpus to make it easier for federal 
courts to avoid the merits of constitutional challenges”). 
 25. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 26. See, e.g., William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn: 
Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 91, 93 (1995) (arguing that Strickland “effectively discarded” the 
judgment in Gideon and that “the Court has effectively ensured that Gideon 
guarantees little more than the presence of a person with a law license 
alongside the accused during trial”). 
 27. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Reforming 
Indigent Defense: How Free Market Principles Can Help to Fix a Broken System, 
666 CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 1 (2010), http://www.cato.org/sites/ 
cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa666.pdf (“Public defender offices around the country 
face crushing caseloads that necessarily compromise the quality of the legal 
representation they provide.”).  
 28. See, e.g., LAURENCE A. BENNER, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, WHEN EXCESSIVE 
PUBLIC DEFENDER WORKLOADS VIOLATE THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL WITHOUT A SHOWING OF PREJUDICE 2 (2011), http:// 
www.acslaw.org/files/BennerIB_ExcessivePD_Workloads.pdf; Eve Brensike 
Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Reallocating Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 685 (2007) (proposing to 
allow appellate lawyers to go outside the trial record when making ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims). 
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about funding priorities to elected legislatures.29 This returns 
traditional liberals to process theory, reinforced by the race-and-
crime narrative.  
Given the critical contribution of defense counsel to the 
reliability of convictions,30 the accuracy narrative endorses 
                                                                                                     
 29. I have not seen the separation-of-powers argument in the scholarly 
literature, but it obviously weighs heavily with the judges who consistently have 
rebuffed systemic challenges to indigent defense systems. For example, in 
Madden v. Township of Delran, 601 A.2d 211, 222 (N.J. 1992), the court rejected 
constitutional challenges to the practice of conscripting lawyers without 
compensation, then closed its opinion as follows: 
Our current system is unworthy of the traditions of this state. We 
note that legislation proposed by the Law Revision Commission would 
require every municipality to provide a public defender for the 
municipal courts. We have no doubt that that is the ideal system, not 
ideal in the sense of unrealistic but ideal in the sense of the best 
system to meet the constitutional requirement. It is the most 
efficient, the fairest, the most likely to achieve equal and effective 
representation of indigent defendants at the least cost. It is a system 
that should be instituted by other branches of government. We urge 
them to act and trust they will. The victim in the present system is 
not the bar, but the poor. 
Id. at 222. The state courts agree that they have inherent power to order 
funding for their own operation. See Michael L. Buenger, Of Money and Judicial 
Independence: Can Inherent Powers Protect State Courts in Tough Financial 
Times?, 92 KY. L.J. 979, 1035–36 (2003–2004) (noting that “many state courts” 
believe “that the judiciary possesses inherent power as a function of being a 
separate branch of government and that this power extends to compelling 
necessary funding”). They also agree that compelling an appropriation to 
preserve the existence of the judicial branch is an option of last resort, reserved 
for extreme cases. See id. at 1041 (“The exercise of [a court’s] inherent powers to 
compel funding must take place only under the most egregious of 
circumstances . . . .”).  
 30. Many, perhaps most, Strickland violations are mediated by caseload 
pressures. See, e.g., Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt not 
be Compelled to Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363, 
409 (1993) 
The ABA Bar Information Program of the Standing Committee on 
Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants funded an analysis of a sample of 
cases from 1970 to 1983 in which there had been findings of 
ineffectiveness of counsel. This study revealed that perhaps 70% of 
these cases could be identified as real or possible cases of “systemic 
failure in adequacy of representation.” The analysis further found 
that “a closer review of these cases reveals that the errors of counsel 
were very frequently occasioned by a systemic impairment or 
restraint which worked to unfairly inhibit or even nullify 
representation by counsel, although counsel was ‘bodily’ in the 
courtroom, totally apart from counsel’s personal skills or abilities.”  
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Gideon albeit on the basis of due process rather than the Sixth 
Amendment.31 The originalists, confronted by strong historical 
evidence against Gideon, endorse Gideon either by surrendering 
theoretical purity or by leaning on such thin reeds as history 
offers.32 While they come by different routes to the premise of a 
right to appointed counsel, both tend to agree with the liberal 
narrative about the practical weakness of indigent defense. 
The agency-costs narrative takes issue with the liberal 
narrative’s version of process theory. Counter-majoritarian 
rulings like Gideon change the incentives motivating police, 
prosecutors, lower court judges, state legislatures, and 
Congress.33 Procedural advantages for the defense can be offset, 
via plea bargaining, if prosecutors over-charge or legislatures 
adopt mandatory minimum sentences.34 The punitive turn thus 
effectively nullified the Warren Court’s attempt to make the 
criminal process less unfair and more reliable. Indeed, the 
Warren Court’s ruling arguably contributed to the punitive 
turn.35 
                                                                                                     
(footnotes omitted). 
 31. See DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE, supra note 14, at 178–80 
(criticizing Strickland for diluting the meaning of effective assistance of counsel, 
and calling for a change of focus to the overall fairness of the trial process under 
due process). 
 32. For example, Justice Scalia has not called for overruling Gideon, even 
though his originalist dissent in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), 
“implicitly questioned whether even Gideon and Strickland were right.” 
Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor 
to Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1148 (2011); see also Padilla, 130 
S. Ct. at 1495 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s reasoning, “[e]ven 
assuming the validity of” Gideon and Strickland, and reminding the Court that 
“[w]e have until today at least retained the Sixth Amendment’s textual 
limitation to criminal prosecutions”). AMAR, supra note 21, at 140, relies on 
“structural arguments” to trump countervailing evidence such as the first 
federal criminal code’s provision for appointing counsel only in capital cases. See 
Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112, 118  (authorizing appointment of counsel 
for capital defendants). 
 33. See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History 
of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 210–15 
(2002) (describing the public and political response to the Warren Court’s 
counter-majoritarian criminal procedure decisions, including Gideon). 
 34. See Stuntz, Uneasy Relationships, supra note 17, at 5, 55 (clarifying 
how severe minimum sentences and “overbroad criminal statutes” help 
prosecutors pressure defendants into pleading out). 
 35. See Friedman, supra note 33, at 214–15 (describing the public backlash 
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On this view, the punitive turn made the right to counsel a 
sideshow. Because the prosecutor’s last best offer is practically 
coercive, counsel’s role is “meet ‘em, greet ‘em and plead ‘em.”36 
Yet this has not led to calls for overruling Gideon.37 Instead, the 
most prominent proposals call for rolling back the punitive turn 
by limiting prosecutorial charging power and the severity of 
prison sentences.38 The system would still be adversarial, rather 
than inquisitorial, with a continuing role for appointed counsel.  
My thesis derives from this overlapping consensus of 
scholarly opinion. This Article argues that Gideon’s failure was 
not just determined, but over-determined. Regardless of whether 
Gideon’s holding is properly grounded on originalism, due 
process, or the evolution of precedents, the punitive turn would 
have neutralized the adversary system. Even if the federal courts 
had steered a true course against prevailing political incentives, 
and held the conviction of the guilty hostage to the demand for 
effective public defender systems, well-funded defense systems 
would still confront effectively coercive prosecutorial discretion.  
The reverse is also true. If the federal courts had imposed 
decent restraints on prosecutorial power and sentencing severity, 
inadequate support for indigent defense would have left most 
defendants, guilty and innocent alike, in no position to make good 
use of a genuine option to stand trial. Gideon failed because of 
both the political incentives noted by liberal process theorists and 
                                                                                                     
against the Warren Court as crime rates rose in the 1960s, and how Richard 
Nixon’s timely presidential victory allowed him to place two conservative 
justices on the Supreme Court). Friedman explained that Chief Justice Burger 
shared President Nixon’s disagreement with the Warren Court’s criminal 
procedure decisions. Id. at 215.  
 36. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1793 
(2001) (citing Alan Berlow, Requiem for a Public Defender, AM. PROSPECT, June 
5, 2000, at 28). 
 37. See Abe Krash, Commentary, Conference on the 30th Anniversary of the 
United States Supreme Court’s Decision in Gideon v. Wainwright: Gideon and 
the Public Service Role of Lawyers in Advancing Equal Justice, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 
1, 27 (1993) (“[C]ritics have urged the Supreme Court to limit or to overrule 
various decisions of the 1950s and the 1960s with respect to the rights of 
accused persons, but no responsible voice—no responsible voice—is heard today 
urging that the Gideon decision should be overruled.”). 
 38. See infra notes 103–06 and accompanying text (describing reform 
proposals). 
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the substance-procedure feedback loop noted in the agency-costs 
account.  
The accuracy and race-and-crime critics are also right about 
Gideon. While doctrinal form certainly did not determine 
Gideon’s failure, the judiciary’s focus on the Bill of Rights, a 
charter preoccupied with procedure rather than substance, made 
it harder for the courts to come to grips with the substance-
procedure feedback loop.39 Even without grotesque racial 
disparities, political incentives and the punitive turn probably 
would have crippled the right to counsel. Nonetheless, draconian 
yet discretionary supply-side drug enforcement gave the punitive 
turn a major impetus.40 The distribution of drug enforcement’s 
pain on racial minorities made that pain politically more 
sustainable than it should have been.41  
Part II of this Article briefly summarizes the Supreme 
Court’s doctrine respecting the right to appointed counsel. Part II 
then, again briefly, summarizes the prevailing state of indigent 
defense. Part III then considers Gideon’s manifest failure from 
the standpoint of the scholarly literature, focusing on the liberal 
and agency-costs narratives. Illuminatingly, each of these 
perspectives locates a distinct weakness in Gideon’s project.  
Part IV then develops two thought-experiments. In the first, 
the Supreme Court, rather than retreating from Gideon in 
Strickland and subsequent cases, vigorously insisted on effective 
representation for indigent defendants. What would have 
happened? If nothing else changed, the punitive turn in 
substantive law would still have vested prosecutors with the 
power to make functionally coercive, outcome-determinative plea 
“offers.” Even well-prepared defense lawyers would have little 
choice but to advise even clients plausibly claiming factual 
innocence to plead out.  
In the second thought-experiment, the Supreme Court 
decided Strickland just as it appears in the U.S. Reports. 
Prosecutorial power and excessive sentences, however, are 
curtailed by the menu of reforms put forward by Professor 
                                                                                                     
 39. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text (neglect of due process). 
 40. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discretionary drug 
enforcement). 
 41. See id. (same).  
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Stuntz—minus his proposal for invigorating indigent defense. In 
this experiment, typical defendants could dare to stand trial 
without risking catastrophic penalties. Holding right-to-counsel 
law constant, however, would mean that legislative neglect of the 
defense function would give defendants electing trial poor 
prospects for winning. Those prospects, moreover, would decline 
as an increasing percentage of defendants elected trial in the 
absence of catastrophic trial penalties. 
Part V confronts the implications of Part IV. For Gideon to 
succeed, there must be both a commitment of resources to the 
defense function and effective regulation of the plea bargaining 
process. For liberals this makes a case for another top-down 
Criminal Procedure Revolution orchestrated by the Supreme 
Court. For skeptics who find the bloom long since off the rose of 
judicial activism, the logical alternative to despair is exploration 
of institutional arrangements that promise at least some hope of 
offering all defendants a fair trial, despite the prevailing politics 
of crime and justice. As with the general consistency of the 
critiques the various perspectives support, so too with the 
directions for reform. Liberals may not expect much from 
legislatures just as political economists doubt the prospects for 
truly counter-majoritarian judicial intervention. Both camps 
should be happy to see their expectations falsified. 
II. Gideon’s Failure 
A. The Impact of Gideon 
Johnson v. Zerbst,42 decided twenty-five years before Gideon, 
held that the “Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in 
all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an 
accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the 
assistance of counsel.”43 The right of indigent defendants to 
appointed counsel in all felony cases, however, did not apply to 
prosecutions in state courts. Under Betts v. Brady,44 Fourteenth 
Amendment due process required appointing counsel for indigent 
                                                                                                     
 42. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
 43. Id. at 463 (footnote omitted). 
 44. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
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defendants only when the totality of the circumstances of any 
given case made denial of counsel fundamentally unfair.45 Gideon 
overruled Betts and incorporated the Sixth Amendment rule of 
Zerbst into Fourteenth Amendment due process.46  
Gideon did not appear revolutionary. By 1963, only a few 
states, concentrated in the south, did not appoint counsel for all 
felony defendants.47 Outside of those states, Gideon did not 
require dramatic changes. By contrast, the ruling two years 
before in Mapp v. Ohio48 had imposed the exclusionary rule on 
roughly half the states, including cosmopolitan northern 
jurisdictions like New York and Massachusetts.49 The ruling 
three years later in Miranda50 imposed a novel interrogation 
procedure on all fifty states.51 Justice Harlan dissented in Mapp 
and Miranda but concurred in Gideon.52  
Nonetheless the new federal right to counsel in state cases at 
least potentially promised nationwide systemic reforms. Even 
under the due process test, the mere fact that a licensed attorney 
was assigned to represent the accused did not automatically 
satisfy the right to counsel. In Powell v. Alabama53 the Court 
treated appointment of counsel on the day of trial as a 
                                                                                                     
 45. See id. at 473 (concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
mandate assistance of counsel in every criminal case). 
 46. Gideon v Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (overruling Betts). 
 47. See Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The “Art” of Overruling, 
1963 SUP. CT. REV. 211, 267 (noting that, prior to Gideon, “thirty-eight states 
ha[d] legal provisions requiring the appointment of counsel in such cases, and 
seven more almost invariably follow[ed] that procedure as a matter of practice” 
(footnotes omitted)); Brief for Petitioner at 30, Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (No. 155) 
(“There remain only five states—Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
and South Carolina—which do not make provision for appointment of counsel in 
behalf of indigents in all felony cases.”). 
 48. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  
 49. Id. at 655, 660 (applying the Fourteenth Amendment’s exclusionary 
rule to the states and invalidating a state criminal conviction based on an 
unconstitutional search of Mapp’s home). 
 50. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
 51. See id. at 478–79 (outlining the procedural safeguards required to 
protect the suspect’s privilege against self-incrimination). 
 52. See, e.g., id. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“I believe the decision of the 
Court represents poor constitutional law and entails harmful consequences for 
the country at large.”). 
 53. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).  
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constructive denial of counsel altogether.54 In federal cases after 
Zerbst, the courts of appeal had developed a test for the adequacy 
of appointed counsel cribbed from the due process cases. If 
counsel’s performance made the trial fundamentally unfair—“a 
farce and mockery” of justice—then the appointment failed to 
satisfy Zerbst.55 
So Gideon made the quality of indigent defense a federal 
question. While almost all states appointed counsel for indigent 
felony defendants, the quality of indigent defense was widely 
seen as dubious. For example, Alabama argued in Gideon that 
the defense bar was so bad that typical defendants were really 
better off without such advocates: 
Many observers of the criminal trial scene are of the opinion 
that today only a few lawyers who undertake criminal defense 
cases are equal matches for career prosecutors whose intimate 
familiarity with a wide variety of criminal charges and 
prosecution techniques makes them formidable adversaries. 
This demonstrates that, generally speaking, indigent persons 
charged with crime are not as unfortunately situated as critics 
of the Betts v. Brady rule would have us believe.56 
Doubts about the effectiveness of criminal defense were by no 
means confined to the South. According to Norman Lefstein:  
The quality of representation in the 1960s was indescribable 
compared to what it is today. We are light-years ahead of 
where we were. I began in the fall of 1963 doing criminal 
defense representation in the old D.C. Court of General 
Sessions as part of Georgetown’s Prettyman Fellowship 
program. Having lawyers intoxicated in the courtroom was not 
uncommon. I’d see lawyers drinking in the men’s room and 
encounter empty liquor bottles strewn around. I have a 
distinct memory of a lawyer interviewing a client in the cell 
block, right before a court appearance. After talking to the 
client, the lawyer announced to the other lawyers in the cell 
                                                                                                     
 54. See id. at 71 (calling the late appointment of counsel in a capital case a 
“clear denial of due process”). 
 55. See Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 668–69 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (writing that 
the Sixth Amendment requires a showing that “the proceedings were a farce 
and a mockery of justice” in order to grant habeas corpus relief). The Court of 
Appeals emphasized that “to justify habeas corpus on that ground an extreme 
case must be disclosed.” Id. at 669. 
 56. Brief for State of Alabama as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 
10, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (No. 155). 
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block, without shame or embarrassment, that “my client has 
no money so I am going to plead him right away.”57 
In 1973, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association 
reported a nationwide study based on both questionnaires and 
site inspections. The study found that  
the resources allocated to indigent defense services have been 
found grossly deficient in light of the needs of adequate and 
effective representation. Relatively few indigent defendants 
have the benefit of investigation and other expert assistance in 
their defense. Their advocates are overburdened, 
undertrained, and underpaid, and as recent studies have 
shown, the poor have as little confidence in such advocates, 
who are often hand-picked by the same authority which 
pronounces their sentence, as they do in the inherent fairness 
of the American criminal justice system.58 
Even in federal courts, in which Johnson v. Zerbst had been 
the law since 1938, the quality of defense representation was less 
than excellent. Judge David Bazelon declared that “a great many 
‘if not most’ indigent defendants do not receive the effective 
assistance of counsel guaranteed them by the 6th Amendment.”59 
Bazelon had “often been told that if my court were to reverse 
every case in which there was inadequate counsel, we would have 
to send back half the convictions in my jurisdiction.”60  
In the immediate aftermath of Gideon, two other 
developments put new strains on the already struggling systems 
of indigent defense. First, in Douglas v. California,61 a companion 
case to Gideon, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause 
required appointing appellate counsel for the indigent at the first 
appeal-as-of-right.62 In 1967, In re Gault63 extended the Gideon 
                                                                                                     
 57. See Malia Brink, An Interview with Norman Lefstein, 30 CHAMPION 38, 
38 (2006).  
 58. NORMAN LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR 14 (1982) 
(quoting NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE 70 
(1973)). 
 59. David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (1973) (footnote omitted). 
 60. Id. at 22–23.  
 61. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
 62. See id. at 358 (describing a state’s denial of court-appointed counsel on 
appeal as a “meaningless ritual”). 
 63. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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rule to juvenile delinquency adjudications.64 Coupled with other 
decisions extending the right to counsel, the practical 
consequence was to increase the demand for indigent defense 
representation in many jurisdictions that were appointing trial 
counsel before Gideon.65  
Second, during the 1960s and 1970s, crime rates went up. 
“From 1961 to 1974, murder rates nearly doubled and robbery 
rates more than tripled.”66 With more offenses came more 
prosecutions.67  
The systems that had struggled to handle pre-Gideon 
caseloads saw those caseloads increase dramatically. According to 
Professor Stuntz: 
Criminal defense has been treated both more and less 
generously. Budgets in the early 1970s saw enormous 
percentage increases, but from a very low baseline. By the late 
1970s, the increases had slowed considerably. Total spending 
on indigent defense rose slightly more than 60% in constant 
dollars between 1979 and 1990; state and local spending on 
indigents roughly doubled. Meanwhile, the percentage of cases 
in which defendants were given appointed counsel was also 
rising, from just under half in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
to 80% by 1992. And the total number of criminal cases was 
rising as well: State court felony filings more than doubled 
between 1978 and 1990. Thus, notwithstanding nominal 
budget increases, spending on indigent defendants in constant 
                                                                                                     
 64. See id. at 73 (stating that the application of Gideon “must include with 
special force those who are commonly inexperienced and immature”). 
 65. See, e.g., Suzanne E. Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional 
Responsibility, and Competent Representation, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 473, 477 
(“Clearly, the combined effect, in terms of the legal personnel required to fulfill 
the promise made in these decisions, is enormous. This increase in the demand 
for criminal defense attorneys has had substantial impact on the systems used 
to provide defense services.”).  
 66. Gary LaFree, Explaining the Crime Bust of the 1990s, 91 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 269, 270 (2000) (reviewing ALFRED BLUMSTEIN & JOEL WALLMAN, 
THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA (2000)) (footnote omitted).  
 67. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 505, 536 nn.126–28 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, Pathological 
Politics] (explaining that by the late 1970s, state court felony prosecutions had 
increased by 36%, much faster than the growth in crime rate and prosecutorial 
staffing). 
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dollars per case appears to have declined significantly between 
the late 1970s and the early 1990s.68 
If the Supreme Court had adopted a robust standard of effective 
assistance, legislatures would have faced a forced choice between 
allocating dramatically more resources to indigent defense and 
scaling back the number of felony prosecutions.  
Judge Bazelon, for example, proposed setting a required list 
of specific duties, prominently including a duty to investigate, 
coupled with a presumption of prejudice from the neglect of any 
required duty.69 Bazelon’s own estimate that this would require 
reversing half the convictions coming to the appellate courts is a 
measure of just how revolutionary Gideon might have been.70 So 
a great deal depended on how the Supreme Court ultimately 
defined the minimum standard of effective assistance.  
Instead, in Strickland v. Washington the Supreme Court 
adopted the now notorious two-pronged test of ineffective 
assistance. On appeal, the defense must show that counsel acted 
outside the range of professional competence and that counsel’s 
errors prejudiced the accused.71 Strickland has been the subject 
of sustained academic criticism since it came down.72 We turn 
now to exploring just why the state of indigent defense remains 
in crisis after almost thirty years under Strickland. 
                                                                                                     
 68. Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 17, at 9–10 (footnotes 
omitted). 
 69. United States v. DeCoster (DeCoster III), 624 F.2d 196, 275 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) (en banc) (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (“That upon showing a substantial 
violation of any of counsel’s specified duties, a defendant establishes that he has 
been denied effective representation and the burden shifts to the government to 
demonstrate that the violation did not prejudice the defendant.”). 
 70. Supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 71. See id. at 694 (“The defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”). 
 72. See generally DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE, supra note 14, at 
179 (“The worse the pretrial investigation was, the harder it is to prove that the 
investigation prejudiced the defendant”); Geimer, supra note 26, at 93 (arguing 
that Strickland “effectively disgraced” the judgment in Gideon); Bruce A. Green, 
Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of “Counsel” in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. 
REV. 433, 503 (1993) (“[T]he Strickland standard affords no relief in cases where 
unqualified defense counsel provides poor representation in every respect, but 
commits no single egregious error that, standing alone, cannot be explained as a 
reasonable strategic option.”). 
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B. The Current State of Indigent Defense 
I have previously remarked on the paradox of Gideon: it is 
generally agreed that Gideon was a great decision, yet it is also 
generally agreed that Gideon was not required by text and 
history and has not led to effective representation of typical 
indigent defendants.73 Gideon indeed makes a great story. 
“Clarence Gideon’s journey to the Supreme Court of the United 
States was a piece of storybook Americana—the luckless 
drifter . . . the least of men, could appeal to the highest, the most 
august court of the land. And once there, not only would he be 
heard, but he would triumph.”74 
Gideon’s “triumph” is indeed “storybook”—an unrealized 
dream, a myth. Attorney General Eric Holder reported common 
knowledge in 2010: 
As we all know, public defender programs are too many times 
under-funded. Too often, defenders carry huge caseloads that 
make it difficult, if not impossible, for them to fulfill their legal 
and ethical responsibilities to their clients. Lawyers buried 
under these caseloads often can’t interview their clients 
properly, file appropriate motions, conduct fact investigations, 
or spare the time needed to ask and apply for additional grant 
funding.75 
General Holder’s view is shared by the overwhelming weight of 
scholarly opinion.76 
                                                                                                     
 73. Donald A. Dripps, Up from Gideon, TEXAS TECH L. REV. (forthcoming 
2013) (manuscript at 2), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2120782. 
 74. ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 405 (1997).  
 75. Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Address at the Department of Justice 
National Symposium on Indigent Defense: Looking Back, Looking Forward, 
2000–2010 (Feb. 18, 2010) http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-
100218.html, (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 76. See, e.g., Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 6, at 2063–64  
Although analysts of the criminal justice system may disagree about 
the best solution to the problems facing indigent defense, there is 
broad consensus that criminal defense systems are in “a state of 
perpetual crisis.” As two commentators recently noted, “[t]he grave 
inadequacy of existing systems for serving the indigent is widely 
acknowledged and widely discussed.” In fact, since the 1963 Gideon 
decision, a major independent report has been issued at least every 
five years documenting the severe deficiencies in indigent defense 
services. 
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The ABA Standards recommend a maximum annual caseload 
of 150 felonies or 400 misdemeanors per attorney,77 but most 
defendants are prosecuted in jurisdictions that are over those 
numbers, many dramatically over. Using the ABA Standards as 
the benchmark, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that: 
Twenty-seven percent of county-based public defender offices 
reported sufficient numbers of litigating attorneys to handle 
the cases received in those offices in 2007. About a quarter 
(23%) of all offices reported less than half of the number of 
litigating attorneys required to meet the professional 
guidelines for the number of cases received in 2007.78 
“The huddled masses in holding pens will be surprised to learn 
that they are ‘equal before the law.’ Indigent defendants are 
lucky to have a warm body and even a few minutes to discuss 
their case with that warm body.”79  
                                                                                                     
(footnotes omitted). 
 77. See AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING 
DEFENSE SERVICES § 5-5.3 cmt. (3d ed. 1992) 
The standards of the National Advisory Commission, first developed 
in 1973, have proven resilient over time, and provide a rough 
measure of caseloads. They recommend that an attorney handle no 
more than the following number of cases in each category each year: 
150 felonies per attorney per year; or 
400 misdemeanors per attorney per year; or 
200 juvenile cases per attorney per year; or 
200 mental commitment cases per attorney per year; or 
25 appeals per attorney per year.  
(footnote omitted).  
 78. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUB. NO. NCJ 
231175, COUNTY-BASED AND LOCAL PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007, at 10 
(2010), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/clpdo07.pdf. It should be noted 
that a focus on the number of offices probably understates the scope of the 
problem, since the urban offices that handle the most cases are also the most 
likely to be overstretched.  
 79. THOMAS, supra note 14, at 21.  
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III. Leading Academic Critiques of the Court’s Right-to-Counsel 
Jurisprudence 
A. The Liberal Narrative 
The basic liberal narrative about constitutional criminal 
procedure celebrates the Warren Court’s project of reforming the 
criminal process to advance liberty and equality, and condemns 
the Supreme Court’s pro-prosecution turn in the years since 
Warren’s retirement in 1969.80 In the right to counsel context, the 
liberal narrative celebrates Gideon and condemns Strickland.81  
Liberal commentators follow Justice Marshall’s Strickland 
dissent by criticizing both the performance prong of the test and 
the prejudice prong.82 The performance prong is too vague to 
guide defense counsel or lower courts, and the presumption of 
competence serves to mask what in many cases are not “tactical 
choices” but simple blunders.83 The prejudice prong insulates 
even failures of the performance prong from reversal; the 
defendant saddled with a record made by an ineffective advocate 
must rely on that very record to prove the probable consequences 
of the misrepresentation.84  
                                                                                                     
 80. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text (describing liberal support 
for the Warren Court’s criminal justice decisions). 
 81. See, e.g., Geimer, supra note 26, at 93 (criticizing Strickland and the 
Burger Court). 
 82. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 707 (1984) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (expressing disagreement with both the performance and prejudice 
prongs adopted by the Court). 
 83. See, e.g., Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: 
Old Roads, New Paths—A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 82 (1986) (arguing 
that Justice O’Connor’s concerns about handcuffing defense counsel are 
unpersuasive and “[a]ppropriately rigorous professional standards for 
appraising counsel’s conduct should not discourage the type of attorney one 
wants to attract from accepting in forma pauperis assignments”); Meredith 
Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys: A System in 
Need of Reform, 2002 BYU L. REV. 1, 21–24 (criticizing the presumption of 
competence); Green, supra note 72, at 502 (“Relying on the factually 
unwarranted but legally mandated presumption [of competence], courts 
frequently reject ineffective assistance claims premised on defense counsel’s 
failure to present a case at the sentencing proceeding or even to investigate the 
possibility of a defense.” (footnote omitted)).  
 84. See Geimer, supra note 26, at 93 (writing that Strickland and 
subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence has “undermined, if not virtually 
destroyed, the right of indigent accused to have counsel do the kind of things . . . 
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Strickland therefore undermines Gideon. Legislatures 
disinclined to fund indigent defense know that the failure to 
provide effective representation will lead to the reversal of few if 
any convictions.85 Given liberal process theory’s skepticism about 
legislative incentives in the criminal justice field, the Supreme 
Court ought to revisit Strickland and replace it with at least 
some concrete duties, linked to a presumption of prejudice when 
counsel neglected the required duties.86 In the alternative, the 
Court should approve institutional-reform litigation aimed at 
ensuring qualified attorneys and limiting defender caseloads.87 
B. The Agency-Costs Narrative 
The liberal narrative endorses judicial intervention to 
compensate for defects in legislative incentives respecting the 
criminal process.88 The agency-costs narrative initiated by Judge 
Easterbrook89 and brilliantly elaborated by Professor Stuntz,90 
takes process theory further by asking how the other actors in the 
system respond to judicial rulings on criminal procedure.91 The 
                                                                                                     
that an attorney should reasonably be expected to do”). 
 85. See Berger, supra note 83, at 71 (comparing the possibility of “reversal 
on the ground of attorney inadequacy” to “the camel’s proverbial path through 
the eye of a needle”). 
 86. See, e.g., Benner, supra note 28, at 2 (proposing appeal strategy that 
focuses “on the absence of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings, rather 
than the ineffectiveness of counsel’s conduct”); Geimer, supra note 26, at 168–72 
(proposing a checklist of “Minimal Duties of Capital Defense Counsel,” and 
adding that a judicial finding that these duties have been violated “should shift 
the burden of proving absence of prejudice to the government”). 
 87. See Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an 
Ex Ante Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 264 (1997) 
(outlining factors courts should consider prior to trial in examining a defense 
lawyer’s ability to represent a client); Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 
6, at 2070–72 (discussing advantages of litigated reform of indigent defense, 
including establishing ex ante standards to evaluate effective assistance of 
counsel). 
 88. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (calling for an active judicial 
role). 
 89. Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983).  
 90. See generally Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 17. 
 91. See Easterbrook, supra note 89, at 290 (comparing criminal procedure 
to a market with scarce resources in which interactions among judges, 
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essence of the agency-costs critique is that while the Court has 
constitutionalized criminal procedure, it has not 
constitutionalized the rest of the system.92 In consequence, 
procedural rulings set in motion unforeseen consequences, as 
prosecutors, defense lawyers, and legislatures reacted to the new 
incentive structure.93  
Legislatures may not overrule the Court’s constitutional 
rulings about criminal procedure. Current constitutional law, 
however, leaves legislatures free to underfund indigent defense94 
and to increase both the scope and the severity of the substantive 
criminal law.95 Strickland imposes only an indefinite duty to 
investigate,96 while the bulk of the Warren Court revolution 
                                                                                                     
prosecutors, and defendants “tend to attain . . . the maximum deterrent punch”). 
 92. See Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 17, at 6 
(“Constitutionalizing procedure . . . may tend to encourage bad substantive law 
and underfunding . . . . It may be that . . . courts have been not too activist, but 
activist in the wrong places.”). 
 93. See, e.g., id. at 56, 59 (explaining that “criminal procedure . . . may give 
defense counsel more arguments to raise . . . but at the cost of also giving them 
less time and money to work with,” adding that “every pro-defense procedural 
rule raises the gain to the government from overcriminalization”). 
 94. See id. at 4 
Countermajoritarian criminal procedure tends to encourage 
legislatures to pass overbroad criminal statutes and to underfund 
defense counsel. These actions in turn tend to mask the costs of 
procedural rules, thereby encouraging courts to make more such 
rules. That raises legislatures’ incentive to overcriminalize and 
underfund. So the circle goes. This is a necessary consequence of a 
system with extensive, judicially defined regulation of the criminal 
process, coupled with extensive legislative authority over everything 
else. 
 95. See Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, supra note 67, at 
538  
Anything that broadens criminal liability adds to the range of cases 
prosecutors can win. Likewise, broadening criminal liability makes it 
easier, across a range of cases, to induce a guilty plea—precisely 
because the prosecution is so likely to win if the case goes to trial. 
And more prosecutorial victories at lower cost advances not only 
prosecutors’ welfare, but legislators’ as well. 
 96. See Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 17, at 70 
If this constitutional regulation of defense counsel’s performance had 
worked, it would have regulated funding indirectly. Sixth 
Amendment law would force counsel to perform to a given level, 
thereby forcing states to spend whatever it took to permit counsel to 
perform to that level. But the regime failed. No one has yet figured 
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imposed regulations on police and prosecutors that are largely 
insensitive to factual guilt.97 Defense attorneys have an incentive 
to shun the resource-intensive investigation into factual guilt in 
favor of motions to exclude evidence.98 Prosecutors have an 
incentive to overcharge to deter both suppression motions and the 
exercise of the increasingly expensive (in terms of both resources 
and the risk of losing the case) trial right.99 
                                                                                                     
out a good mechanism for defining a reasonable level of 
representation—more importantly, no one has figured out a way to 
define a reasonable level of attorney investigation. The difficulty is 
that some cases may call for almost no effort while others require a 
lot; separating the categories is at least expensive, and at most 
impossible. The law has responded by retreating to the model of the 
discrete attorney error. Insufficient investigation is basically left 
alone. The upshot is that Gideon, while not trivial, means vastly less 
than it seems. Defendants receive counsel, but counsel must bear 
caseloads that require them to start with a strong presumption 
against any significant investment in any given case. 
 97. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 228 
(2011) [hereinafter STUNTZ, COLLAPSE] (“Warren and his colleagues continued 
and exacerbated a long-term trend: they proceduralized criminal litigation, 
siphoning the time of attorneys and judges away from the question of the 
defendant’s guilt or innocence and toward the process by which the defendant 
was arrested, tried, and convicted.”). 
 98. See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 67, at 570 n.242 
The law of criminal procedure creates a range of claims defendants 
can raise at various points in the process, and those claims tend to be 
cheaper to investigate and litigate than claims bearing on defendants’ 
factual guilt. Legislatures, meanwhile, fund appointed defense 
counsel at levels that require an enormous amount of selectivity—
counsel can contest only a very small fraction of the cases on their 
dockets, and can investigate only a small fraction of the claims their 
clients might have. This effect applies to the mass of criminal 
litigation, since roughly eighty percent of criminal defendants receive 
appointed counsel. The consequence is to steer criminal litigation 
away from the facts, and toward more cheaply raised constitutional 
claims. Those claims tend not to correlate with innocence; or if they 
do, the correlation may be perverse. 
 99. William J. Stuntz, The Political Economy of Criminal Justice, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 780, 841 (2006) [hereinafter Stuntz, Political Economy] 
Notice the incentives Bordenkircher creates. For prosecutors, the 
message is: threaten everything in your arsenal in order to get the 
plea bargain you want. For defendants, the message is simpler: take 
the deal, or else. (The incentive to plead applies to innocent and 
guilty defendants alike. Indeed, it may apply more strongly to 
innocents, who are more risk averse than their guilty counterparts.) 
(footnote omitted). 
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The punitive turn, then, made the Warren Court’s 
“revolution” a dud. Armed with sweeping statutory definitions of 
guilt and draconian mandatory minimum sentences, prosecutors 
became the dominant actors in the system. Plea bargaining went 
from the resolution of most cases in the shadow of the law to the 
resolution of almost all cases with very little practical legal 
constraint.100 While Stuntz was sometimes equivocal, in places he 
argues that the Warren Court bears some responsibility for the 
punitive turn.101 By arming defendants with guilt-insensitive 
procedural rights, the Court encouraged legislatures and 
prosecutors to exploit the constitutionally unregulated parts of 
the system: legislative power over budgets and statutory sentence 
ranges, and prosecutor power over charge selection.  
Stuntz proposed various reforms aimed at recalibrating the 
relationship between the parts of the system regulated by 
constitutional law and the parts left to legislative control or 
executive discretion.102 These included more vigorous judicial 
review of substantive criminal law under the due process clauses 
and the Eighth Amendment,103 judicially-mandated 
appropriations for indigent defense,104 and requiring prosecutors 
to prove that the charges against the accused were similar in 
severity to the charges brought against other defendants who 
engaged in similar conduct.105  
                                                                                                     
 100. See generally William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s 
Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004).  
 101. Compare STUNTZ, COLLAPSE, supra note 97, at 236 (“The law of criminal 
procedure raised the cost of policing and prosecution when that cost was already 
too high, and lowered it when the cost was already too low. The consequence 
was to make both the punishment drop of the 1960s and the punishment rise of 
the following three decades larger and more destructive.”), with id. at 241 (“The 
Supreme Court was not responsible for all this.”); and id. at 242 (“But if the 
Justices did not cause the backlash, they made a large contribution to it.”). In 
Collapse, Stuntz focused more on the role of the Warren Court in prompting a 
tough-on-crime political backlash generally rather than with the rational-actor 
model elaborated in Uneasy Relationship, supra note 17. The two causal 
mechanisms are not mutually inconsistent.  
 102. See, e.g., Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 17, at 66–72. 
 103. See id. at 66–67 (proposing greater judicial control over interpretation 
of law and sentencing). 
 104. See id. at 70–72 (arguing for funding requirements that would directly 
address “serious and common injustices”). 
 105. Stuntz, Political Economy, supra note 99, at 840–41 (“For all sentences 
over some minimum level—say, three or six months—prosecutors should be 
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The liberal narrative’s version of process theory assumed, or 
at any rate hoped, for a stable baseline of statutory law and 
prosecutorial discretion.106 The agency-costs narrative points out 
just how naive (at least in retrospect) the assumption was.107 We 
turn now to consider how far these prevailing narratives diverge. 
IV. Two Thought Experiments 
We can compare the liberal and agency-cost narratives by 
imagining that the key problems identified by each were 
somehow solved. I shall argue that these thought experiments 
suggest that Gideon failed because of both a lack of political will 
and systemic changes that made standing trial an irrational 
option for almost all defendants. Even if the Court compelled 
legislatures to provide adequate resources to the defense 
function, the effective performance of that function would do little 
good to most defendants, including innocent ones. Even if the 
system somehow curtailed prosecutorial discretion and legislative 
sentencing excesses, defendants would not receive fair trials, or 
make well-informed decisions to plead guilty, without the 
commitment of major new resources for the defense function. 
A. The First Experiment: Suppose the Supreme Court Compelled 
Allocation of Adequate Resources for Indigent Defense 
Commentators have offered several alternative reforms of 
the Strickland standard.108 I leave aside the issue of which of 
these alternatives offers the most legitimate and practical route 
to improving indigent defense. The question I pose is, assuming 
that ineffective-assistance doctrine somehow compelled the 
                                                                                                     
required to show that sentences at least as severe have been imposed some 
minimum number of times for the same crime on similar facts. Those limits 
would make sentences less harsh and disparities smaller.”); id. at 841 (“Best of 
all, such limits would also reduce prosecutors’ power in plea negotiations.”).  
 106. See supra Part III.A. 
 107. See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text for an introduction to the 
agency-costs narrative.  
 108. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
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allocation of major new resources to indigent defense, how much 
difference would it make in the processing of typical cases?  
We can base an answer on more than pure speculation. 
Indigent defense in federal prosecutions is generally regarded as 
in much better shape than in most of the states. In the federal 
practice, most judicial districts now have a public defender office, 
whether a creature of the Justice Department (“Federal Defender 
Services”) or as an independent nonprofit legal services 
corporation (“community defender organizations”).109 While 
almost all districts now have a public defender office, conflicts of 
interest among defendants require representation of a significant 
number of defendants (roughly 40%) by private lawyers taking 
individual cases on a fee-for-service basis (“panel attorneys”).110  
Inga Parsons, who spent five years in the Federal Defender 
Division of the New York Legal Aid Society, saw sharp contrasts 
between that office and the Society’s Criminal Defense Division, 
whose lawyers represented defendants in state court: 
My friends who were lawyers with the same Legal Aid Society, 
but defending state cases in the Criminal Defense Division 
                                                                                                     
 109. See JON WOOL, K. BABE HOWELL & LISA YEDID, IMPROVING PUBLIC 
DEFENSE SYSTEMS: GOOD PRACTICES FOR FEDERAL PANEL ATTORNEY PROGRAMS 2 
n.4 (2003) 
Federal public defender organizations are offices of federal employees 
of the judicial branch. Each office is headed by a federal public 
defender who is appointed by the court of appeals for the circuit in 
which the office is located and is subject to removal by the court for 
incompetency, misconduct in office or neglect of duty. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3006A(g)(2)(A). Community defender organizations are nonprofit 
legal service providers established and administered by groups 
authorized by the district CJA plan. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(2)(B). 
Unlike a federal public defender, a community defender operates 
under a board of directors and is not employed by the federal 
judiciary. A community defender may be funded by grants from the 
Judicial Conference or through submission of vouchers on a case-by-
case basis. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).  
 110. See The Defender Services Program, U.S. COURTS, http://www.us 
courts.gov/FederalCourts/AppointmentOfCounsel.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) 
In those districts with a defender organization, panel attorneys are 
typically assigned between 30 percent and 40 percent of the CJA 
cases, generally those where a conflict of interest or some other factor 
precludes federal defender representation. Nationwide, federal 
defenders receive approximately 60 percent of CJA appointments, 
and the remaining 40 percent are assigned to the CJA panel. 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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(hereinafter “CDD”), would constantly complain about the 
assembly line mentality of state courts, where lawyers are 
expected to process, perfunctorily, outrageous caseloads—
sometimes carrying 300 misdemeanors at a time, or the 
juggling of 100 felonies with 200 misdemeanors. These cases 
are stacked in a bin in the courtroom, needing immediate 
attention, with little time to conduct investigations or legal 
analysis—much less to interview the client. 
During these conversations I would think how lucky I was to 
be in the federal system where the culture of lawyering was 
based on traditional notions of adversarial advocacy and 
manageable caseloads. I was supported by an energetic and 
competent support staff, generous training and computer 
services budget, access to talented and experienced trial 
lawyers in-house, and pleasant and commodious office 
facilities. Moreover, my salary was significantly higher than 
that of staff attorneys at the CDD, and essentially on par with 
my adversaries in the United States Attorney’s Office. In sum, 
I felt that I was able to provide individualized adversarial 
advocacy to each and every one of my clients with few cost 
constraints.111 
The reputation of the federal defender offices is generally high.112  
There is some evidence that the panel attorneys are not as 
well-regarded. The Vera Institute’s researchers found that, 
within the federal criminal practice community, federal defenders 
had a better reputation than panel attorneys.113 A 2007 study for 
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) found that 
panel attorneys were not as effective as federal defenders.114  
                                                                                                     
 111. Inga L. Parsons, “Making it a Federal Case”: A Model for Indigent 
Representation, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 837, 840 (footnote omitted).  
 112. See, e.g., WOOL ET AL., supra note 109, at 15 (“Without exception, the 
people we interviewed had high opinions of community defenders and federal 
public defenders.” (footnote omitted)).  
 113. See id. (“Everyone we spoke with said that attorneys in defender offices 
provide at least slightly higher quality representation, on average, than do 
panel attorneys.” (footnote omitted)).  
 114. Radha Iyengar, An Analysis of the Performance of Federal Indigent 
Defense Counsel 28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13187, 
2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13187 (“It appears that public 
defenders outperform CJA panel attorneys in all outcomes that were 
considered.”). For methodological objections, see Study Says Public Defenders Do 
Better than CJA Attorneys, TALKLEFT (July 14, 2007, 11:15 AM), 
http://www.talkleft.com/story/2007/7/14/2111/18099 (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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The NBER study attributed all the difference in outcomes to 
“attorney experience, wages, law school quality and average 
caseload”115—all at least partly functions of the compensation 
paid to the panel attorneys. Since the NBER study, compensation 
levels for panel attorneys have increased: 
Today, panel attorneys are paid an hourly rate of $125 per 
hour in non-capital cases, and, in capital cases, a maximum 
rate of $178 per hour. These rates were implemented January 
1, 2010, for work performed on or after that date. The rates 
include both attorney compensation and office overhead. In 
addition, there are case maximums that limit total panel 
attorney compensation for categories of representation (for 
example, $9,700 for felonies, $2,800 for misdemeanors, and 
$6,900 for appeals). These maximums may be exceeded when 
higher amounts are recommended by the district judge as 
necessary to provide fair compensation and the chief judge of 
the circuit approves.116 
The arithmetic works out to seventy-seven fully compensable 
hours for felony cases. Compared to the rates charged by elite 
private firms, this is low indeed.117 Compared to the rates paid in 
many states, it is quite generous.118 
                                                                                                     
 115. Iyengar, supra note 114, at 3. 
 116. The Defender Services Program, supra note 110. 
 117. See, e.g., Allen Abrahamson, Simpson Legal Fees Could Run into 
Millions, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 9, 1994, at A1 (stating that top criminal defense 
attorneys charge between $250 and $400 an hour). 
 118. See Darryl K. Brown, Epiphenomenal Indigent Defense, 75 MO. L. REV. 
907, 912–13 (2010)  
States vary widely with regard to funding levels, funding structures, 
and stability for indigent defense. Hourly rates for appointed counsel 
vary widely. For example, the rate is $40 per hour in Oregon, 
Kentucky, and Wisconsin; $50 an hour in Vermont and Tennessee; 
$60 an hour in South Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, New Hampshire, 
and New Jersey; $90 an hour in Hawaii, Virginia, and California (for 
some felonies in certain localities); and $100 an hour in Nevada and 
Massachusetts (for homicide cases).  
Caps on total fees vary greatly as well. For appointed counsel, 
Virginia limits fees to $600 per case for less serious felonies and 
$1,235 per case for more serious felonies (although courts can grant 
increases up to $2,085). West Virginia has no maximum fee on life-
incarceration felonies and a $3,000 limit on all others. Vermont’s 
limits are $25,000 for life felonies, $5,000 for other major felonies, 
and $2,000 for lesser ones. Nevada’s fees are $20,000 for life-without-
parole felonies and $2,500 for all others. Mississippi’s fees are capped 
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In a recent survey of judges, Richard Posner and Albert Yoon 
found that: “Federal judges generally rate prosecutors as 
comparable in quality to public defenders and significantly better 
than court-appointed counsel or retained counsel. State judges 
agree with respect to the high quality of prosecutors but hold 
retained counsel in higher regard than public defenders or court-
appointed counsel.”119 I am not suggesting the federal indigent 
defense is perfect. It, does, however, appear to be dramatically 
better than its state counterparts, and this difference appears to 
be largely a function of better financial support. Has the relative 
strength of the defense function really benefitted federal 
defendants?  
In the federal system, 97% of convictions result from guilty 
pleas, an even higher rate than the astounding 94% that prevails 
in the state systems.120 In federal cases, the average sentence is 
46 months and the median sentence is 24 months.121 The gross 
figures for the states are somewhat lower, but the great majority 
of murder and rape prosecutions occur in the state systems. 
Despite “three strikes laws,” the “sentences available in a federal 
prosecution are generally higher than those available in state 
court—often ten or even twenty times higher.”122  
Professor Barkow puts it well:  
In the 95% of cases that are not tried before a federal judge or 
jury, there are currently no effective legal checks in place to 
police the manner in which prosecutors exercise their 
discretion to bring charges, to negotiate pleas, or to set their 
office policies. In a national government whose hallmark is 
                                                                                                     
at $1,000, plus overhead reimbursement at $25 an hour. Several 
states have no per-case fee cap.  
(footnotes omitted). 
 119. Richard A. Posner & Albert H. Yoon, What Judges Think of the Quality 
of Legal Representation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 320 (2011).  
 120. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (stating that ninety-
seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions 
are obtained through guilty pleas). 
 121. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS tbl.13 (2009).  
 122. Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define 
the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 998 
(1995).  
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supposed to be the separation of powers, federal prosecutors 
are a glaring and dangerous exception.123 
This is strong language, but, in my view, justifiably strong.  
Barkow sees the incentives and resources available to the 
defense as precluding an effective check.124 As we have seen, 
however, the defense function in federal cases is as strong as we 
have any cause to expect from a public system. The prosecutor’s 
coercive discretion makes a robust defense against the best 
interests of the client.125 Indeed, Professor Stuntz, for one, saw 
the ability of well-heeled white-collar defendants to hire first-rate 
lawyers as contributing to the pathologies attending the punitive 
turn. “Federal law and practice is where overcriminalization and 
oversentencing seem most prevalent—and, not coincidentally, 
that is also where defendants with resources are concentrated 
(which makes overcriminalization especially useful from the 
government’s perspective).”126  
As Barkow notes, Congress “routinely passes laws with 
punishments greater than the facts of the offense would demand 
to allow prosecutors to use the excessive punishments as 
bargaining chips and to obtain what prosecutors and Congress 
would view as the more appropriate sentence via a plea instead of 
a trial.”127 If the defense function became more robust, 
prosecutors could respond by increasing the trial penalty. If 
existing legislation does not provide enough prosecutorial 
leverage (a rather improbable hypothesis), Congress could easily 
supply it.  
                                                                                                     
 123. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: 
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871 (2009) (footnotes 
omitted).  
 124. See id. at 881–82 (finding that prosecutors have significant financial 
leverage over defendants and that defendants and their lawyers often have 
“divergent interests when it comes to bargaining with prosecutors”). 
 125. Ron Wright has pointed out that guilty pleas have disproportionately 
displaced acquittals relative to trial convictions and dismissals. See Ronald F. 
Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 
154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 104 (2005) (“[T]he acquittal slice of the pie in the federal 
system has been shrinking more quickly than the slices for dismissals or trial 
convictions. Acquittals now occupy a smaller portion of the non-plea outcomes 
than at any time since the repeal of Prohibition.”). Even defendants with good 
chances for acquittal are pleading guilty.  
 126. Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 17, at 58.  
 127. See Barkow, supra note 123, at 880 (footnote omitted). 
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Clearly, better representation can benefit individual clients. 
In the prosecutor-dominated system of overcriminalization and 
plenary discretion, however, good representation very often 
means cooperating with the prosecution of suspected 
confederates. From the standpoint of defendants as a class, the 
benefits of flipping first (or holding out longest, an alternative 
strategy) are fixed; it is a zero-sum game.  
So let us indulge the hypothesis that, whether by judicial 
rulings or legislative intervention, state systems of indigent 
defense were brought up at least to the federal standard. We 
would expect state prosecutors and state legislators to act like 
federal prosecutors and Congress. Better support for indigent 
defense would increase the risk of acquittal at trial, increasing 
the incentive of prosecutors to secure a plea. Since constitutional 
law leaves practically no check on charging decisions, prosecutors 
could respond to better investigations by defense counsel by 
increasing the gap between the consequences of plea and trial. 
Since constitutional law leaves practically no check on sentence 
severity, if state law did not permit prosecutors to ratchet up the 
trial penalty, state legislatures could increase the bargaining 
power of prosecutors. From the perspective of political economy, 
the liberal story has no happy ending. 
B. Suppose We Curtailed Sentencing Severity and Prosecutorial 
Discretion 
Now let us explore my second thought experiment. Suppose 
that prosecutorial power to coerce guilty pleas by threatening 
catastrophic trial consequences was curtailed. James Vorenberg 
offered thoughtful proposals more than thirty years ago,128 and 
the recent literature abounds with plausible ideas.129 
                                                                                                     
 128. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1560–72 (1981) (proposing, among other things, fixed trial 
penalty, prosecutorial guidelines, and judicial review of plea bargains).  
 129. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 123, at 874 
[Prosecutors] who make investigative and advocacy decisions should 
be separated from those who make adjudicative decisions, the latter 
of which should be defined to include some of the most important 
prosecutorial decisions today, including charging, the acceptance of 
pleas, and the decision whether or not to file substantial assistance 
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The proposals of Professor Stuntz offer a good focus for the 
experiment. Stuntz proposed (1) less severe sentencing 
legislation;130 (2) one-way judicial sentencing discretion to impose 
sentences below guideline recommendations;131 (3) disparity 
review at sentencing imposing a burden on prosecutors “to show 
that sentences at least as severe have been imposed some 
minimum number of times for the same crime in the same state 
on similar facts”;132 (4) judicial review of plea bargains such as 
occurs in the military justice system where courts “review the 
factual basis of guilty pleas with great care, and with little 
deference to the pleas themselves”;133 and (5) that courts read 
vague normative standards into the meaning of the substantive 
criminal law.134  
Now, Stuntz also proposed “ratcheting up” review of 
ineffective assistance claims in jurisdictions that do not comply 
with funding levels recommended by “expert commissions.”135 
Standing alone, this proposal is no more than another clever 
doctrinal move designed to advance the liberal narrative’s 
concern for effective indigent defense. Its inclusion in Stuntz’s 
reform package is a good indicator of how my thought 
experiment—in which prosecutorial power is regulated but the 
defense function is not improved—would likely turn out.  
More robust guilty-plea procedures would impose new 
demands on defense time as well. The burden might be modest in 
individual cases, but pleas would remain more common by far 
                                                                                                     
motions. 
Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 
157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 964 (2009) (“Prosecutors’ offices should promulgate and 
publish more procedural guidelines to structure their internal review of cases.”); 
Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat 
of Tyranny, 86 IOWA. L. REV. 393, 460–64 (2001) (proposing “Public Information 
Departments” and “Prosecution Review Boards”); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing 
Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1010, 1013 (2005) (proposing “self-regulation by prosecutors prompted by 
[sentencing] commissions and loosely enforced by judges”).  
 130. STUNTZ, COLLAPSE, supra note 97, at 295. 
 131. Id.  
 132. Id. at 297.  
 133. Id. at 302–03 (footnote omitted).  
 134. Id. at 303–04.  
 135. Id. at 299. 
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than trials. If the new system required a 25% increase in defense 
time devoted to guilty pleas, and pleas accounted for 80% of 
dispositions, the defense system would need a 20% increase in 
resources simply to process the guilty pleas.   
Curtailing the trial penalty would remove the biggest 
incentive discouraging defendants from standing trial. 
Converting guilty pleas into mini-trials would reduce the cost to 
the prosecution of trial relative to plea. More trials would result. 
If the guilty plea rate went down from 95% to 80%, the number of 
trials would quadruple. The same indigent defense system that 
now struggles simply to process guilty pleas would be called upon 
to conduct these trials.  
Unprepared lawyers would beg for continuances that would 
lead to massive trial delays if granted and to seat-of-the-pants 
defense at trial if denied. Innocent defendants would spend more 
time in pretrial detention and have a greater risk of conviction at 
trial. Ineffective assistance would become more common. 
Quadrupling the trial rate without massive increases in defense 
resources is close to unthinkable. 
The first experiment suggests that improving indigent 
defense without reining in sentence severity and prosecutorial 
discretion would do little good. It might even do harm if 
prosecutors respond to the heightened risks of losing trials by 
increasing the trial penalty. The second experiment suggests that 
reigning in sentences and discretion without dramatic 
improvements in the defense function would likewise do little 
good. Trials would be more common but poorly conducted by 
overwhelmed defenders. If even a modest trial penalty survived 
in the new regime, more than a few defendants would suffer that 
penalty after trials that would have ended in acquittal given well-
prepared defense counsel. In short, the compelling arguments for 
reinforcing the defense function in the current system would 
become far stronger in a system that relied more heavily on trials. 
V. Three Reform Agendas 
The agency-costs account establishes a central premise of 
efforts to reform our criminal justice system. We must think of it 
as a system in which court rulings, statutory changes, funding 
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commitments, and discretionary enforcement decisions interact 
with one another.  
For liberals skeptical of constructive legislative intervention, 
that calls for charting an interlocking set of constitutional rulings 
designed to restore an adversary system—a system in which each 
defendant has a genuine advocate and a genuine trial option. For 
conservatives seeking a similar result through legislative 
channels, the logical way to seek systemic reform through the 
political process is to support the call for a new National 
Commission on Crime and Justice. For pragmatists trying to 
mitigate the worst features of the present system on the 
assumption that the political will to do more is a distant prospect, 
the rather depressing course is also clear. Pragmatists should 
work to rationalize the defense function by looking for ways to 
provide it at less cost and to ration what is available for 
maximum benefit. 
A. A Liberal Agenda: Planning for a Second Revolution 
Positive political theorists136 and progressive 
constitutionalists137 doubt the chances for genuinely constructive 
counter-majoritarian judicial review. Yet the widely held view 
that the Court’s role in the criminal process is distinct from its 
more general constitutional docket has considerable factual 
foundations. For the most part, the early critics of the Warren 
Court gave Mapp, Gideon, and Miranda a free pass.138 Those 
decisions have not been overruled, although they have been 
qualified by two generations of justices more conservative than 
their authors. In Crawford v. Washington139 and Apprendi v. 
                                                                                                     
 136. See generally Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The 
Supreme Court as National Policymaker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957) (arguing 
generally that the Court protects minority rights after a national consensus 
emerges on behalf of those rights). 
 137. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM 
THE COURTS (1999).  
 138. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF 
PROGRESS 49 (1970) (describing Miranda as “a radical, if justifiable, departure 
from prior practice”). 
139. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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New Jersey,140 the current Court has carried forward an active 
role in regulating criminal procedure.141  
The current structure of the constitutional jurisprudence, in 
which the Court announces substantial Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendment limits on police, prosecutors, and courts, then leaves 
those limits to be subverted by constitutionally unregulated plea 
bargaining against the background of constitutionally 
unregulated authorized sentences, was not inevitable. It was a 
near-run thing, more near-run than the agency-costs account 
invites us to suppose.  
The key plea bargaining case, Bordenkircher v. Hayes,142 was 
decided by the margin of five to four.143 All of the Eighth 
Amendment cases upholding recidivism enhancements were five-
to-four decisions.144 In Grady v. Corbin,145 the Court majority 
adopted (temporarily!) a transactional test of “same offense” in 
the Double Jeopardy Clause, a doctrine that could have provided 
the basis for a constitutional merger doctrine that could have 
prevented charge stacking.146 
With robust judicial scrutiny of trial penalties, a 
constitutional merger rule, and a prohibition on sentences longer 
than twenty-five years for crimes not involving immediate threat 
to human life or sexual assault, prosecutorial power would have 
                                                                                                     
140.  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 141. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69 (holding that an admission of 
testimonial hearsay from an unavailable declarant violates the confrontation 
clause absent an opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine the declarant); 
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (holding that a mandatory sentencing enhancement 
triggered by a specific factual finding by the sentencing judge violates the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial).  
 142. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). 
 143. See id. at 365 (Blackmun, J., joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, 
dissenting); id. at 368 (Powell, J., dissenting).  
 144. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 32 (2003) (Stevens, J., joined by 
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg and Souter, dissenting); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 
U.S. 957, 1009 (1991) (White, J., joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, 
dissenting); id. at 1027 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 
263, 285 (1980) (Powell, J., joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, 
dissenting). Justice Stewart joined the majority in Rummel only with expressed 
distaste for the statute. See id. at 285 (Stewart, J., concurring).  
 145. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by United States v. 
Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993).  
 146. Id. at 516. 
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remained considerable but not plenary. The liberal narrative 
holds that the Supreme Court came close to adopting these 
doctrines, but fell short, more from a policy preference for the 
prosecution than from a shortage of plausible doctrinal 
resources.  
The Court’s recent Sixth Amendment decisions in Padilla,147 
Frye,148 and Cooper149 break relatively modest doctrinal 
ground.150 They may portend something far more momentous—a 
majority willing to try to resuscitate the adversary system. 
Justice Scalia, for one, seems to think that it would be “foolish 
to think that ‘constitutional’ rules governing counsel’s behavior 
will not be followed by rules governing the prosecution’s 
behavior in the plea bargaining process.”151 
The first shot in a new revolution would be a ruling that 
effective assistance of counsel must be established affirmatively 
at the plea colloquy.152 If the trial court refuses to enter a plea 
absent a record of factual investigation and sound legal advice 
by counsel, the present house of cards would collapse.  
That turn actually would call forth major new resources for 
indigent defense. As we have seen, however, a more vigorous 
defense can do little but advise surrender in the face of 
draconian potential penalties and prosecutorial power to impose 
those penalties for the crime of standing trial. What liberal 
                                                                                                     
 147. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 148. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1789 (2012). 
 149. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
 150. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (holding that failure to communicate plea 
offer to client was ineffective assistance); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384 (holding that 
erroneous legal advice inducing defendant to reject a plea offer was ineffective 
assistance); Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (holding that a failure to advise a client 
that a guilty plea might result in deportation was ineffective assistance of 
counsel). In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), the Court held that erroneous 
advice about the potential sentence could constitute ineffective assistance 
entitling the defendant to withdraw a plea. Id. at 56–57. Padilla, Frye, and 
Cooper involved attacks on trial convictions by defendants who were led to reject 
a plea offer by bad advice. Thus far it is generally held that Frye and Cooper did 
not make “new law” for purposes of federal habeas. See, e.g., Hare v. United 
States, 688 F.3d 878, 879 (7th Cir. 2012). Since Cooper was a state case reversed 
on habeas by the Court, there seems to be little room for arguing otherwise.  
 151. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1392 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 152. On this possibility, see Donald A. Dripps, Plea Bargaining and the 
Supreme Court: The End of the Beginning?, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 141, 142 (2012). 
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scholarship needs to do is less to devise fresh doctrinal avenues 
to a stronger defense function than to explore whether there are 
legitimate doctrinal avenues for reconsidering Harmelin153 and 
Bordenkircher.  
If a majority of the justices wants to reinvigorate the defense 
function, the doctrinal tools are readily at hand. The judicial will 
may well be lacking. If, however, we do witness a second criminal 
procedure revolution, it will fail, as did the first, unless the Court 
perceives the systemic feedback loops and can find legitimate 
doctrinal ways to channel them. 
B. A Conservative Agenda 
Liberal process theory turns to judicial review precisely 
because when legislatures have intervened in the criminal justice 
process, they have all but invariably acted to criminalize new 
conduct and increase existing penalties, without regulating the 
discretion of police and prosecutors. Conservative hostility to 
judicial intervention, however, does not necessarily imply 
complacency with mass incarceration and prosecutorial 
dominance. An important strand of contemporary conservative 
thought indeed sees the modern criminal justice system as big 
government with its usual defects.  
Almost fifteen years ago, John Dilulio decided that “two 
million prisoners are enough.”154 Chief Justice Rehnquist 
lamented the indiscriminate federalization of criminal law.155 
More recently, Edwin Meese III has led a “Right on Crime” 
movement aimed at responsible reductions in incarceration, a 
movement supported by several leading conservatives.156 The 
                                                                                                     
 153. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).  
 154. John Dilulio, Two Million Prisoners Are Enough, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 
1999, at A14. 
 155. See William H. Rehnquist, Remarks on the Federalization of Criminal 
Law, Address Before the American Law Institute (May 11, 1998), in 11 FED. 
SENTENCING REP. 132 (1998) (stating that the number of cases brought into 
federal court through the federalization of state crime is straining judicial 
resources).  
 156. Charles Savage, Trend to Lighten Harsh Sentences Catches on in 
Conservative States, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
08/13/us/13penal.html?_r =18 (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (noting that the “Right 
on Crime” movement supported by Edwin Meese III, Newt Gingrich, Grover 
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arbitrary power of contemporary prosecutors sits uncomfortably 
with conservative principles.157  
For principled conservatives dismayed by the excesses of 
American criminal justice but loathe to embrace judicial 
intervention, the responsible course is to engage the political 
branches. Professor Broughton puts it well:  
But there are natural political consequences—or, more 
accurately, obligations—if conservatives adhere to this 
critique. If conservatives insist on a judiciary that is as 
deferential to political actors as the one I have described, 
thereby leaving the Eighth Amendment and judicial review as 
ineffectual constraints on criminal punishment, then they 
must be prepared to advocate political action that will chain 
the American criminal justice Leviathan.158 
Any such political campaign confronts at least two major 
challenges.  
The first is the continued perception of professional 
politicians that anything smacking of “soft on crime” is political 
suicide.159 The second is the integrated nature of the justice 
system’s component parts—federal, state, and local, as well as 
substantive criminal law, funding decisions, prosecutorial 
discretion, and constitutional court decisions. Incremental reform 
risks unintended consequences; sweeping proposals have even 
less of a chance of political success. 
The logical course for those who seek reform through 
legislation is to seek from the legislature a commitment to take 
seriously a set of recommendations from a broadly-based 
                                                                                                     
Norquist, Asa Hutchinson, and William Bennett) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 157.  Cf. BARRY GOLDWATER, THE CONSCIENCE OF A CONSERVATIVE 57 (1960) 
(“The enemy of freedom is unrestrained power, and the champions of freedom 
will fight against the concentration of power wherever they find it.”). 
Goldwater’s specific context was monopoly power, but his principle is general 
and it might fairly be added that the modern prosecutor is a monopolist.  
 158. J. Richard Broughton, Some Reflections on Conservative Politics and 
the Limits of the Criminal Sanction, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 537, 558 (2010). 
 159. See, e.g., TONRY, supra note 9, at 4 
Americans are having second thoughts about the wisdom of current 
antidrug and anticrime policies, but elected politicians most places 
are afraid to change them. To do so runs risks of being tarred as soft 
on crime and, until significant numbers of politicians take that risk 
and get reelected, most will not take the chance.  
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comprehensive study of the criminal justice system. Former 
Senator Jim Webb proposed The National Criminal Justice 
Commission Act, which has yet to become law but in prior 
incarnations has passed the House and been reported out of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee.160 The bill has the support of the 
ABA, the Innocence Movement, and the International Association 
of Chiefs of Police.161 
Liberals have some cause for skepticism about the 
commission approach. The last national commission, the 1967 
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration 
of Justice, produced a superb report.162 The report triggered 
congressional legislation subsidizing local police, repudiating 
Miranda, and authorizing wiretapping.163 
Yet those who seek reform should not permit their fears to 
frustrate their hopes. Some 2012 election results hint at a new 
public mood about crime and punishment. Voters in Washington 
State and Colorado passed ballot measures legalizing marijuana 
possession,164 and a recent poll shows a slim national majority in 
favor of withholding federal enforcement in states that have 
legalized.165 California voters rolled back the notorious “three 
                                                                                                     
 160. See National Criminal Justice Commission Act of 2010, S. 714, 111th 
Cong. (2010). 
 161. See id.  
 162. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE 
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967).  
 163. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3711 (1968). If the title of the statute is thought insufficiently suggestive, the 
relevant legislative history frankly declares: “The major purpose of Title III is to 
combat organized crime.” S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2153–58 (1968), reprinted in 
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2157. The unofficial history of Title III reveals 
unmistakably the law-enforcement orientation of the legislation. See Richard 
Harris, Annals of Legislation—the Turning Point, NEW YORKER, Dec. 14, 1968, 
at 68, 164–76 (discussing legislators’ sense of public demand for tough-on-crime 
policies). 
 164. See, e.g., Aaron Smith, Marijuana Legalization Passes Colorado, 
Washington, CNNMONEY, http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/07/news/economy/mari 
juana-legalization-washington-colorado/index.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) 
(“Voters in Washington and Colorado passed ballot initiatives Tuesday to 
legalize marijuana for recreational use.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 165. Micah Cohen, Marijuana Legalization and States Rights, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 9, 2012), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/08/marijuana-
legalization-and-states-rights/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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strikes” law by requiring a conviction for a violent offense for the 
third “strike,” and made the change effective retroactively.166  
Liberals have good reasons for skepticism about the political 
prospects, but ought to support any legislative movement to 
ratchet down penalties and regulate prosecutorial discretion. 
Likewise conservatives should not be too rigid in opposing reform 
from the courts. After all, the Court has given legislatures carte 
blanche for thirty years, and the results have been lamentable. 
And it is possible that some strong signals from the Court might 
be the catalyst that, like a commission, both prompts reforms and 
gives reformers some political protection.  
Constitutional history shows that the Court’s successful 
interventions are those that either prompt or parallel prevailing 
political opinion. Brown v. Board of Education167 reflected a 
national consensus against Southern segregation and led to 
actual desegregation only after the Civil Rights Act of 1964.168 
The Court recognized equal protection rights for women only 
after Congress proposed the Equal Rights Amendment.169 It 
                                                                                                     
 166. See Debra Cassens Weiss, A Third of Three Strikes Inmates in 
California Could Benefit from Vote to Ease Law, A.B.A.  J. (Nov. 8, 2012), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/a_third_of_three-strikes_inmates_in_ 
california_could_benefit_by_vote_to_eas/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
167. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).   
 168. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social 
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
2062, 2392 (2002) 
Little desegregation occurred between 1955 and 1966, in large part 
because the Supreme Court was uncertain as to how enthusiastically 
district judges would follow its lead and whether the Eisenhower 
Administration would back it up. Actual integration occurred all over 
the South between 1966 and 1971, in large part because the Johnson 
Administration and the Warren Court both pressed school districts to 
take affirmative action to integrate (and districts risked losing 
needed federal money if they did not). The Court’s sex discrimination 
cases were easier for the nation to swallow because they were 
congruent with legislative reforms in states all over the country. 
 169. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegal, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement 
Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1323, 1324 (2006) 
In the 1970s, a mobilized feminist movement persuaded Congress to 
send an Equal Rights Amendment to the states for ratification. With 
energetic countermobilization, the ERA was defeated. In this same 
period, the Court began to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment in 
ways that were responsive to the amendment’s proponents—so much 
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overruled Bowers v. Hardwick170 after the great majority of the 
states, Georgia included, had abandoned their sodomy statutes, 
either by legislation or judicial decision.171 Lawrence v. Texas172 
was followed within a decade by repeal of Don’t Ask Don’t Tell.173 
This past November voters in three more states authorized gay 
marriage.174  
So liberals and conservatives should see appeals to the courts 
and a new commission as complementary. Hope from legislatures 
might prompt action by the courts, and action by the courts might 
prompt action from legislatures.  
Signs of a fresh judicial assault on the status quo might 
reinforce the case for a commission, and also reinforce the 
political defense of elected leaders who act to approve 
recommended reforms. A commission might stimulate a political 
movement to roll back mass incarceration. If it turns out that 
even a commission is beyond the range of current political vision, 
                                                                                                     
so that scholars have begun to refer to the resulting body of equal 
protection case law as a “de facto ERA.”  
(footnote omitted). 
 170. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).  
 171. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573  
The 25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced 
in the Bowers decision are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their 
laws only against homosexual conduct. In those States where sodomy 
is still proscribed, whether for same-sex or heterosexual conduct, 
there is a pattern of nonenforcement with respect to consenting 
adults acting in private. 
See also Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998) (holding sodomy statute 
contrary to state constitution’s right of privacy); Jack M. Balkin, What Brown 
Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1543 (2004) (“By 
the time Lawrence was decided, the movement for gay rights had gained more 
success in winning over popular opinion and shifting popular attitudes in favor 
of decriminalization than the corresponding movement for desegregation had 
achieved when Brown was decided.”).  
172. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).   
 173. See Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 
Stat. 3515. 
 174. See, e.g., Lila Shapiro, Gay Marriage Victory in Maine, Maryland; 
Minnesota Votes Down ‘Traditional’ Amendment, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 7, 
2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/gay-marriage-victory_n_20859 
00.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (“On Election Day Tuesday, voters in Maine, 
Maryland and Washington chose to legalize gay marriage.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
924 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 883 (2013) 
the liberals’ case for judicial review would be correspondingly 
strengthened. If instead substantial reforms passed into law, the 
Justices could weigh the results when they consider, for example, 
whether to modify Strickland or Bordenkircher. 
C. A Pragmatic Agenda 
At present indigent defense is constitutionally required, but 
only in anemic form. Legislators have consistently failed to 
provide the levels of funding that would be required for even 
minimally adequate representation. For the immediate future 
there is little prospect of dramatic changes from either the 
Judicial or the Legislative Branch. And as we have seen, standing 
alone, a more vigorous defense function could do little to resist 
legislative excess or executive caprice.  
This unhappy state of affairs calls for rational allocation of 
the distinctly limited resources. Darryl Brown is right that if we 
have never known anything but underfunding of indigent 
defense, “rationing occurs whether or not it is thoughtful and 
deliberate.”175 He would have defenders concentrate on pressing 
plausible claims of factual innocence and resisting charges 
carrying the heaviest penalties.176 I have recently suggested some 
alternative approaches: eliminating the right to appointed 
counsel in felony cases that do not carry sentences of 
incarceration, giving appellate defenders discretion to decline 
unpromising appeals, and permitting defense representation by 
lay advocates and trained specialists rather than generalist 
lawyers.177 The more seriously these proposals are taken, the 
more likely they are to shame judges and legislators into taking 
some constructive steps. If it turns out that shame is not 
enough—as it hitherto has proved to be178—then indeed rationing 
would seem to be the logical course. 
                                                                                                     
 175. Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An 
Argument from Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 834 (2004).  
 176. Id. at 818 (“[W]e should distribute limited defense resources (1) toward 
strategies more likely to vindicate factual innocence, and (2) toward charges and 
clients who have the most at stake or are likely to gain the greatest life benefit.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 177. Dripps, Up from Gideon, supra note 73.  
 178. “Shameful” is the term widely and justly applied. For example, a term 
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VI. Conclusion 
Gideon failed both because legislators undervalue the rights 
of the accused and because prosecutors and legislators exploited 
their unconstrained power over charge selection and sentence 
severity. Liberals see a case for constitutional constraints on 
charge selection and sentence severity. Conservatives see a case 
for reaching the same ends through other channels.  
A stronger defense function is essential to comprehensive 
reform, but, standing alone, would do little to restore a truly 
adversarial system. Liberals should applaud political efforts to 
secure comprehensive criminal justice reform from the political 
branches. If those efforts come to naught, as they so often have, 
conservatives may need to reconsider whether addressing “the 
disaster that is contemporary American criminal justice”179 is 
really less important than an abstract commitment against 
judicial activism.  
  
                                                                                                     
search on December 9, 2012 for “indigent defense” /p shameful in the Westlaw 
Law Reviews and Journals database produced thirteen hits.  
 179. STUNTZ, COLLAPSE, supra note 97, at 307.  
